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REPLY
ASSISTED SUICIDE, LIBERAL
INDIVIDUALISM, AND VISCERAL
JURISPRUDENCE: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY
ERIC A. JOHNSON*
This Reply answers a critique by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky of the Alaska Supreme Court’s recent decision upholding the state’s ban on assisted suicide. The author argues that a constitutional right to assisted suicide would
have to be grounded on the detrimental assumption that
disabilities make life less worthy of protection. The author
also argues that recognition of a right to assisted suicide
would paradoxically diminish personal freedom by exposing society’s most vulnerable members to coercion to end
their lives.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the occasion of Justice Jay Rabinowitz’s retirement from
the Alaska Supreme Court in 1997, former law clerk Steve Williams delivered a short tribute in which he commented upon Justice
Rabinowitz’s “commitment to intellectual integrity, [and] to rigor-
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ous analysis.”1 Williams recalled that as a clerk he once had made
the mistake of asking Justice Rabinowitz how he “felt” about an
2
issue in a case. Justice Rabinowitz responded: “We don’t practice
3
visceral jurisprudence here.”
“Visceral jurisprudence” is just what Professor Erwin Chem4
erinsky has offered up in his recent critique of the Alaska Supreme
5
Court’s decision in Sampson v. State. In Sampson, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the wrenching question whether terminally
ill persons have a right to the assistance of a physician in commit6
ting suicide. Any adequate response to this question must, of
course, reckon with the powerful emotions evoked by the dying
process. So it is appropriate that Professor Chemerinsky begins his
critique of Sampson by recounting the suffering endured by his fa7
ther during his final days. But Professor Chemerinsky’s reaction
to his father’s suffering does not merely inform his analysis; it
serves as a substitute for analysis. From his experience, Professor
Chemerinsky moves directly to the conclusion that the right to privacy “must include a right, for those like my father, to die with dig8
nity.” He treats the court’s disagreement with him as a kind of insensitivity and, of even more concern, as a betrayal of Justice
Rabinowitz, “the visionary and architect of so much Alaska consti9
tutional law, including the right to privacy.”
In his haste to bring his experience to bear on the issue, Professor Chemerinsky gets even the basics wrong. The Alaska Supreme Court did not, for example, apply a “rational basis” test to
Sampson’s claim that he was entitled to the assistance of a physi10
cian in committing suicide. The court found, as it had in its land-

1. Steve Williams, Rabinowitz Tributes, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 205, 206 (1998).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, Privacy and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill
the Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29 (2003).
5. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
6. Id. at 90.
7. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 38.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 48 (citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975)).
10. Id. at 37. Professor Chemerinsky’s mistake appears to be attributable to
an assumption that the Alaska courts apply the same two-tiered framework as do
the federal courts; thus, he assumes that the court’s refusal to recognize a “fundamental right” to assisted suicide foreclosed any form of review but mere “rational
basis” review. This assumption, though understandable, is wrong. The Alaska
courts have always recognized the availability of intermediate levels of scrutiny in
the privacy context and in other contexts. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504 (applying
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mark decision in Ravin v. State,11 that the state’s action implicated a
12
“non-fundamental privacy or liberty interest[].” And the court
accordingly applied to Sampson’s claim the same intermediate
level of scrutiny that it had applied to Ravin’s: the court required
the state to “identify a legitimate government purpose and show
that the challenged limitation bears a close and substantial rela13
tionship to that purpose.”
But the flaws in Professor Chemerinsky’s critique go far
deeper than this. As explained below, the recognition of a right to
assisted suicide would endanger the very values Professor Chemerinsky purports to embrace. Instead of “respecting people,” the
recognition of a right to assisted suicide might “endanger personhood” by exposing vulnerable persons to coercion to end their
14
lives. Further, because a right to assisted suicide would have to be
based on an objective determination that the disabilities accompanying terminal illness make life less worthy of protection, recognition of that right would have the effect of reinforcing the common
misperception that life as a disabled person is “undignified” or
“degraded.”
II. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EQUALITY
During oral argument in Sampson, the plaintiffs’ attorneys
framed the question presented as whether the state should be required to respect individuals’ “deeply held personal beliefs” about
15
dying. According to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, the plaintiffs believed that terminal illness had robbed their lives of dignity and the
plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that the State ought to be required to
16
respect this belief. In response, Justice Bryner asked plaintiffs’ attorney Kathryn Tucker whether the plaintiffs’ argument would not,
in fact, require the court not only to respect this view but to adopt it

intermediate scrutiny in privacy context); Alaska Pac. Assur. Co. v. Brown, 687
P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984) (indicating various levels of scrutiny).
11. 537 P.2d at 504.
12. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 95 (Alaska 2001).
13. Id. at 95-96; see Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504 (requiring the state to show a “close
and substantial relationship” between the government’s interest and corresponding limitation).
14. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11, at 1370-71
(2d ed. 1988) (“[L]egalizing euthanasia, rather than respecting people, may endanger personhood.”).
15. Audio tape: Oral Argument, Sampson v. State, No. S-9338 (Nov. 14, 2000)
(on file with Clerk of Alaska Appellate Courts).
16. Id.
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and even “constitutionalize” it.17 Tucker moved confidently past
18
this question. But this question by Justice Bryner, the author of
the Sampson opinion, actually goes to the heart of the debate over
assisted suicide.
Because the proposed constitutional right to assisted suicide
19
would extend to some persons but not to others, the right cannot
be based merely on respect for individuals’ strongly held personal
convictions. Respecting strongly held personal convictions would
mean respecting not just the convictions of those who think that
terminal illness makes life valueless, but also the convictions of
those who think that being poor or ugly or chronically (but not
terminally) ill makes life valueless. It would also mean respecting
the convictions of those who believe that life is not worth living
under any conditions; after all, there is nothing irrational about
“look[ing] upon our life as an episode unprofitably disturbing the
20
blessed calm of nothingness.” Because Professor Chemerinsky
presumably does not, and realistically could not, advocate providing lethal drugs to everyone who sincerely believes his or her life to
be valueless, his right must be based on the conclusion that some
21
lives are objectively less valuable than others.
Further, this objective valuation would have to be based on
disability, rather than on, say, physical pain. The 1999 report on
Oregon’s experiment with assisted suicide showed that pain was
not a decisive factor in the decisions of the “case patients” to com22
mit suicide. Only one of the fifteen patients who committed physician-assisted suicide expressed concern to the physician about in23
adequate pain control. This data is consistent with numerous
other studies, which show that requests for assisted suicide rarely
24
are motivated by pain or fear of pain. Not surprisingly, physical
17. Id.
18. Id. Tucker argued that “the role for the court is to define the nature and
scope of the constitutional right and the State then has the option to come in and
seek to meet its legitimate interests through reasonable legislation.” Id.
19. The plaintiffs in Sampson, for example, argued that the right should extend only to those in the “final phase of a terminal illness.” Id.
20. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, On the Suffering of the World, in
SCHOPENHAUER: ESSAYS AND APHORISMS 41, 47 (1851) (R. J. Hollingdale ed.,
1970).
21. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 15-11, at 1367-68 (acknowledging the danger
inherent in “having the state regularly make judgments about the value of a life”).
22. Arthur Chin et al., Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: The
First Year’s Experience, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 577, 581 tbl.3 (1999).
23. Id. at 581.
24. See, e.g., Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919,
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pain played only a very minor role in the efforts of the Sampson
plaintiffs to justify assisted suicide. The plaintiffs argued, for example, that creation of a right to assisted suicide would be justified
“[e]ven if it were possible to eliminate all pain for a dying pa25
tient.”
The principal basis for the plaintiffs’ argument was the “indignity” that supposedly accompanies the dying process, not the pain.
The plaintiffs said that the dying process itself deprives the terminally ill person of “dignity” and even of “any real and remnant
26
humanity.” They further described the disability that accompa27
nies the dying process as “degradation.” And they argued that assisted suicide enables the terminally ill person to “preserve or re28
Likewise, Professor
gain some element of personal dignity.”
Chemerinsky frames the question presented by Sampson as
whether terminally ill persons should have a right “to die with dig29
nity.”
Unlike the concept of pain, the concepts of “dignity” and
“degradation” are expressions of prevailing social norms. As Professor Peter Hammer has said, “[d]ignity is inherently a relational
30
concept, defining the person with respect to her community.”
Thus, feelings of indignity or degradation are not caused directly by
terminal illness. Rather, they are caused by the community’s reactions to the disabilities that accompany terminal illness or by the
patient’s expectation of adverse community reaction. In Professor
Hammer’s words, “[f]eelings of indignity are largely fears of rejec31
tion by our community.” Two of the most important fears of rejection that accompany the dying process are the fear of violating

924 (1996); Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Attitudes and Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347
LANCET 1805, 1809, 1810 nn. 6, 12 (1996).
25. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 20, Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska
2001) (No. S-09338).
26. Id. at 36.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 36.
29. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 38.
30. Peter Hammer, The Individual, the Community, and Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 42 U. MICH. L. QUAD. NOTES No. 2, 84, 86 (1999); see also OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 726 (Compact ed. 1971) (defining “dignity” as “[t]he quality of being worthy or admirable; worthiness, worth, nobleness, excellence”);
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 324 (10th ed. 1999) (defining
“dignity” as “the quality or state of being worthy, honored, or esteemed”).
31. Hammer, supra note 30, at 86.
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social norms related to incontinence and the fear of violating social
32
norms related to dependence on others.
The violation of social norms related to incontinence is what
proponents of assisted suicide often mean by “indignity” and “degradation.” As the Oregon government acknowledged in its 1999
and 2000 reports on the practice of assisted suicide in Oregon, the
desire to commit assisted suicide is strongly associated with con33
cerns about “the loss of control of bodily functions.” Plaintiff
Kevin Sampson himself relied on the “embarrassment” associated
with urinary incontinence in explaining his own desire to commit
34
suicide.
The violation of social norms related to dependency and productivity are another important aspect of what proponents of assisted suicide mean by “indignity.” In its 2000 report, the Oregon
government acknowledged that one of the factors driving patients’
requests for lethal drugs was a concern about being a burden on
35
friends and family. Of the patients who died by assisted suicide in
Oregon during 1999, twenty-six percent affirmatively expressed
concern to their physicians about being a “burden on friends, fam36
ily or other caregivers.” Tellingly, in the Alaska Civil Liberties
Union’s amicus brief for Sampson, the organization treated lack of
productivity as a reason to commit suicide. It began its brief with a
quotation from Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s suicide note, where she
said that a “quick and easy death” is appropriate “when all useful37
ness is over.”
Social norms related to incontinence and to “usefulness” are
38
remediable. That is, feelings of disapproval and disgust toward
32. Chin et al., supra note 22, at 581.
33. Id. at 581 tbl.3; Amy Sullivan et al., Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in
Oregon: The Second Year, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 598, 601 tbl.2 (2000).
34. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 5, Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001)
(No. S-09338). Cf. WILLIAM MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 101 (1997) (exploring “extended metaphorization” wherein “the anus is seen as the footing on
which our dignity depends,” though not in the context of incontinence).
35. Sullivan et al., supra note 33, at 601 tbl.2.
36. Id.
37. Brief of Amici Curiae Alaska Civil Liberties Union at 5, Sampson v. State,
31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001) (No. S-09338); cf. MILLER, supra note 34, at 136 (affirming that social norms require the patient somehow to “earn this right [of dignity], or pay for it in some way by recognizing a reciprocity in the relation”). Of
course, the terminally ill person ordinarily will lack the ability to reciprocate.
38. This very point was made by physicians in the wake of the first Oregon
report. For example, the editors of the American Medical News pointed out:
“Fears over loss of autonomy or of bodily function are dramatically different than
intractable pain. They represent perception, fear, anticipation, abstraction.”
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those whose physical disabilities make them unproductive or incontinent are not a necessary element of every human being’s worldview. These social norms can be displaced by social norms
grounded on “recognition of the intrinsic worth and the inherent
39
dignity of man” —on recognition that every person “possesses in40
nate value as a human being,” regardless of whether his disabilities make him unproductive or incontinent.
What is most troubling, though, about the arguments of the
Sampson plaintiffs is not that the plaintiffs overlooked the remediability of the “indignities” and “degradation” that accompany the
dying process. It is that the plaintiffs asked the court to ratify the
very social norms that give rise to these feelings of indignity and,
worse yet, to hold that suicide is an appropriate alternative to violating these norms.
Imagine the effect of this decision, not just on the terminally
ill, but on the disabled community as a whole. In his memoir,
Moving Violations, paraplegic reporter John Hockenberry ponders
the question of how his friend Roger, a quadriplegic “who constantly needed others to take care of his basic needs,” would react
41
to questions about the possibility of assisted suicide. He asks:
“How might Roger laugh off the nagging suspicion that the person
dressing him believed that suicide would be a more elegant solu42
tion to his predicament than going on with his life?”
Assisted Suicide: Lesson Learned in Oregon, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 22/29, 1999, at
20, available at http://www.amaassn.org/scipubs/amnews/amn_99/edit0322.htm.
Two physicians made the same point in a letter to the editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine, which had published the Oregon report. Legalized
Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. No. 3, 212 (1999).
After pointing out that the Oregon report had cited loss of autonomy and control
of bodily functions as factors most strongly associated with requests for physicianassisted suicide, they urged other physicians to “recognize that physical disability
is not the same as the loss of spiritual, emotional, intellectual, or environmental
autonomy. To reduce the desire for physician-assisted suicide, we must try to
alleviate disability and loss of autonomy, as well as the stigma attached to these
conditions.” Id.
39. State v. Lancaster, 550 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Alaska 1976) (recognizing that society values rehabilitation of criminals because there is an underlying value that
must be recognized in all individuals regardless of what such persons have done).
40. Id.
41. JOHN HOCKENBERRY, MOVING VIOLATIONS 77 (1995).
42. Id.; see also Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by the Compelling, Heartwrench Case, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121,
1134 (1998) (“[T]he legalization of PAS/euthanasia for certain patients would
change the way these patients and those around them would view their lives—and
the ‘hastening’ of their deaths.”).
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The psychological effects on the disabled of a court decision
recognizing a limited constitutional right to choose suicide over
disability are not a trivial or peripheral issue. Similar concerns
formed the crux of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
43
Board of Education, in which the Court famously said that a separate but equal education for African-American children “generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un44
done.” Similar concerns formed a critical part of Justice Ken45
nedy’s powerful opinion last term in Lawrence v. Texas. In recognizing for the first time that consensual sexual relations among
members of the same sex are protected by the constitutional right
to privacy, Justice Kennedy relied in part on the psychological impact of sodomy statutes and of the Court’s own decision in Bowers
46
v. Hardwick. Of Bowers he said, movingly: “Its continuance as
47
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.” Similarly,
the recognition of a limited constitutional right “to die with dignity” would demean the lives of those who must daily endure the
very “indignities” that form the basis for the arguments of proponents of assisted suicide.
This, of course, is primarily an argument about equality (which
48
is protected by the Alaska Constitution). But it is also an argument about autonomy. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in Lawrence, “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of lib49
erty are linked in important respects.” A court decision that consciously perpetuated the social norms that currently oppress the
disabled would not merely be an assault upon equality. It would be
an assault on freedom, too.
III. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND AUTONOMY
In Peter Handke’s 1972 novel Short Letter, Long Farewell, the
narrator travels to America and then across it, ostensibly in pursuit
50
of his estranged wife. For part of his journey, he is joined by an
American friend, Claire. At one point, the narrator explains to
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. Id. at 494.
45. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
46. Id. at 2478 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
47. Id. at 2482.
48. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
49. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2482.
50. See generally PETER HANDKE, SHORT LETTER, LONG FAREWELL (Ralph
Mannheim trans. 1974).
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Claire that, since arriving in America, he has felt as though the
51
world really were “open” to him. Though he associates this feeling—“that the world is open to each one of us”—with the 19th century, he announces his intention “to take it seriously and to exam52
ine it.” Claire responds: “Until you run out of money.”
The recognition that genuine autonomy requires something
more than freedom from government interference—like money,
for instance—is what differentiates present-day liberal individualism from its 19th century predecessor. Our distance from the earlier form of liberal individualism is apparent when we reread the
53
majority opinion in Lochner v. New York. In justifying its decision to strike down a New York law that would have limited bakery employees to a sixty-hour work week, the majority used the
language of personal liberty. It said, for example, that wage and
hour laws failed the test that legislation must not be “an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the
54
individual to his personal liberty.” One cannot help but perceive
the court’s use of these words as a misuse. For, although Lochner
did limit government interference in the affairs of individuals, it did
not advance the cause of “personal liberty” as we now conceive of
it.
As we now think, wage and hour laws advance autonomy by
protecting the individual from coercion by other persons or by im55
personal economic forces. A baker who has the “liberty” to work
more than sixty hours per week may well lack the freedom to work
less than sixty hours per week. And a baker who has the “liberty”
to sell his labor for less than minimum wage may well lack the
freedom to sell it for more. In a laissez faire society, the people
who work in bakeries are “free” to make decisions about the disposition of their labor only until they run out of money. Once they
run out of money, they are subject to the coercion of market forces.
Wage and hour laws are not the only laws that advance personal autonomy by restricting individual liberties. For example,
laws prohibiting prostitution protect women from physical coercion
56
by other persons, as well as from economic coercion. Similarly,
51. Id. at 120-21.
52. Id. at 120.
53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (upholding the freedom to contract under the Fourteenth Amendment).
54. Id. at 57.
55. See TRIBE, supra note 14, at 578 (discussing the abandonment of Lochner’s
premises due to economic considerations).
56. See Alexandra B. Stremler, Sex for Money and the Morning After: Listening to Women and the Feminist Voice in Prostitution Discourse, 7 U. FLA. J.L. &
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decisions refusing to recognize a “consent” defense to charges of
domestic violence assault, which essentially deny women the right
to participate voluntarily in abusive relationships, protect women
57
from coercion by other forces, including economic distress.
In short, these examples demonstrate that, in some circumstances, the alternative to government coercion is coercion by
other forces. Where an individual, but for government regulation,
would be exposed to coercion by economic forces or by other private individuals, and where those coercive forces are not themselves readily amenable to regulation, the interests of individual
autonomy often will be, paradoxically, advanced by government
coercion of the individual herself. As Professor Tribe has said: “a
court must decide, in this society and at this time, whether a person’s choice to act or think in a certain way should be fundamentally protected against coercion by law, recognizing that the alternative in some situations may be coercion by economic or peer
58
pressure.”
This was the very dilemma faced by the Alaska Supreme
Court in Sampson. The court did not choose between personal
autonomy and some other competing value, as Professor Chemerinsky suggests. It chose, as it had to, between permitting government coercion, on the one hand, and exposing the terminally ill
person to ungovernable coercion from other sources, on the other.
The court quoted from the report of the New York Task Force on
Life and Law, which had aptly summarized the choice: “if assisted
suicide and euthanasia are legalized, the autonomy of some patients would be extended while the autonomy of others would be
59
compromised by the pressures to exercise these new options.”
The court decided, of course, that the dangers of recognizing a constitutional right to assisted suicide—the dangers that vulnerable
persons would be pressured to commit suicide by family members

PUB. POL’Y 189, 200 (1994-1995); see also Summers v. Anchorage, 589 P.2d 863,
870 (Alaska 1979) (rejecting the claim that prostitution is protected by the right to
privacy); Hilbers v. Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31, 41-43 (Alaska 1980) (rejecting the
claim that a statute violated the right to privacy by prohibiting the exposure of the
patron’s or masseuse’s genitals in massage parlor).
57. See State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27, 31 (N.J. Super. 1976) (holding that a victim cannot consent to assault and battery as a matter of law).
58. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1307 (emphasis added).
59. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 96 (Alaska 2001) (citing NEW YORK TASK
FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 134 (1994)).
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or by social or economic forces—were serious enough to justify
60
leaving the question to democratic processes.
Professor Chemerinsky argues that “the Alaska Supreme
Court overstated the problems of recognizing a right to physician61
assisted suicide.” He dismisses the court’s concerns about “pro62
tecting vulnerable individuals” in a single sentence: “Oregon has
dealt with these concerns in its ‘Death with Dignity’ law allowing
physician-assisted suicide, as have foreign countries such as the
63
Netherlands.” But this is inadequate for several reasons.
First, the Netherlands experience, far from sustaining Professor Chemerinsky’s argument, goes a long way toward refuting it.
Though the Dutch courts, in theory, require a request from the patient that is “entirely free and voluntary” as well as “well consid64
ered, durable, and persistent,” these legal guidelines appear to
have had little or no impact on the actual practice of euthanasia in
the Netherlands. For example, the results of a study commissioned
by the Dutch government showed that “doctors administered a lethal drug without an express request in 1000 cases—almost half as
65
many as they did on request.” What is perhaps most chilling
about the Netherlands’ experience is the insistence of the Dutch
66
government that nothing is wrong. “[B]oth the government and
[the Royal Dutch Medical Association] seem determined to reveal
67
nothing that is seriously critical of Dutch euthanasia policies.”
The same, unfortunately, is true of the Oregon government’s
supposed efforts to monitor its brief experiment with assisted sui68
cide. Perhaps the best example of the methodological bias in the
Oregon reports is the decision of the 2000 report’s authors to interview only the physicians who had prescribed lethal drugs to the
“case patients,” not those who had refused to prescribe such medi69
cation. (The 2000 report was issued while Sampson was before

60. Id. at 58.
61. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 39.
62. Sampson, 31 P.3d at 96.
63. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 39.
64. JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 264 (1997).
65. Id. at 276.
66. See HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH 134-35 (1997) (citing Dutch
government-sanctioned reports that fail to criticize euthanasia policies).
67. Id. at 134.
68. Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin, The Oregon Report: Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, May-June 1999, at 42 (“[T]hose administering
the law and those sanctioned by the government to analyze its operation have become its advocates.”).
69. Sullivan et al., supra note 33, at 598.

111103 JOHNSON.DOC

332

12/29/03 2:01 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[20:2

the Alaska Supreme Court and was addressed by both parties
during the appeal.) Of the twenty-seven patients who were given
lethal drugs in 1999 and for whom data were available, only eight
70
received the lethal medication from the first physician they asked.
Ten of the patients were refused the drugs by one physician.71
Eight of the patients were refused the lethal drugs by two or three
72
doctors before finding a doctor who would prescribe them. But
the authors of the report did not even interview the non73
prescribing doctors. Thus, there is no information in the report,
for example, as to whether the doctors’ decisions not to prescribe
the drugs were driven by concerns about depression or coercion.
The authors only noted that because terminally ill patients often
have more than one physician, “to maintain consistency in data
74
collection, we only interviewed the prescribing physician.”
Needless to say, these kinds of reports are not the stuff of which
constitutional rights are made.
Further, Professor Chemerinsky errs in assuming that close
predictive judgments about the dangers of legalizing assisted suicide are the appropriate domain of the courts. The Alaska Supreme Court has always recognized that the court’s particular aptitude is the resolution of questions of “adjudicative fact[]”—”who
75
did what, when, where, how, and with what motive and intent.”
Courts are not well suited to the resolution of questions of “legislative fact”; that is, to the re-examination of the broad economic, social, and scientific assumptions upon which the legislature bases its
76
policy judgments. Accordingly, even where the right to privacy is
at stake, the Alaska courts often have deferred to the legislature in
the close calculation of the potential harm from an activity. This
was true, for example, in State v. Erickson, where the Alaska Supreme Court deferred to the legislature’s judgment on the dangers
77
It was also true in Harrison v. State,78 where the
of cocaine.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 601.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id.
CENTER FOR DISEASE PREVENTION AND EPIDEMIOLOGY, OREGON
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT:
THREE YEARS OF LEGALIZED PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE 8 (2001), available at
http://www.ohd.hr.state. or.us/publichealth/chs/pas/year2/ar-about.cfm.
75. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Alaska 1978).
76. Id. at 17 (“[I]t is not the function of this court to reassess the scientific evidence in the manner of a legislature. . . .[A] holding that a legislative enactment is
invalid cannot rest on a debatable medical issue.”).
77. Id. at 17-18.
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Alaska Court of Appeals effectively deferred to the legislature’s
79
judgment on the dangers of alcohol.
Finally, Professor Chemerinsky’s argument reflects a fundamental misperception of the task facing the court in Sampson. The
court was called upon to decide whether to deny the people of
Alaska a voice in resolving one of the most important and difficult
questions the state has ever faced. The assumption that the court
would do so lightly—on the basis of passing references to Oregon
and the Netherlands and to the opinion of Professor Tribe—is not
only inconsistent with the court’s history, it is fundamentally at
odds with the values embodied in liberal individualism. Participation, through the democratic process, in the shaping of one’s society was not perceived by either America’s or Alaska’s founding fathers as a disfavored adjunct to individual autonomy; it was
perceived as an integral part—perhaps the most important part—of
autonomy. As Judge Andrew Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit (a
former law clerk to Justice Rabinowitz) said in his dissent in Com80
passion in Dying v. Washington : “That a question is important
does not imply that it is constitutional. The Founding Fathers did
not establish the United States as a democratic republic so that
elected officials would decide trivia, while all great questions would
81
be decided by the judiciary.”
IV. CONCLUSION
Some or all of the justices of the Alaska Supreme Court undoubtedly brought to the Sampson case experiences comparable to
Professor Chemerinsky’s experience at his father’s deathbed. And
some or all of the justices undoubtedly would have liked to make
the option of assisted suicide available to their loved ones. What
distinguished their decision in Sampson was, in part, their willingness to look beyond their own experiences to the very different experiences of those to whom the recognition of a right to assisted
suicide would prove profoundly dangerous:
[I]t must be recognized that assisted suicide and euthanasia will
be practiced through the prism of social inequality and prejudice
that characterizes the delivery of services in all segments of society, including health care. Those who will be most vulnerable to
abuse, error, or indifference are the poor, minorities, and those
who are least educated and least empowered . . . .

78. 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
79. Id. at 339.
80. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
81. Id. at 858.
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. . . [T]here [is no] reason to believe that the practices, whatever
safeguards are erected, will be unaffected by the broader social
and medical context in which they will be operating. This as82
sumption is naïve and unsupportable.

The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision was not a capitulation
to the forces of conservatism, or even to the forces of moderation.
To the contrary, the decision expressed the court’s continuing
commitment to personal liberty, as well as its continuing “commit83
ment to intellectual integrity, [and] to rigorous analysis.” The
people of Alaska can be thankful that the court’s commitment to
intellectual integrity and rigorous analysis—and the court’s resultant recognition of the grave dangers posed to vulnerable populations by a right to assisted suicide—meant more to the court than
the opportunity to be, in Professor Chemerinsky’s words, “a na84
tional leader.”

82. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 97 (Alaska 2001) (quoting NEW YORK TASK
FORCE ON LIFE & LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 125 (1994)).
83. Williams, supra note 1, at 206.
84. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 48.

